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Abstract
This paper studies optimal linear taxation in a general equilibriummodel with Cournot oligopoly.
The main result is the following. With imperfect competition the tendency toward “inverse elastic-
ities” tax rules will be weakened and may even be reversed. That is, an upward sloping relationship
may exist between an industry’s optimal tax rate and its own-price elasticity of demand, unlike the
perfectly competitive case.
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1 Introduction
One of the central results in public economics is the Ramsey (1927) optimal
tax rule. This paper will show that the structure of optimal taxes implied
by the Ramsey rule is highly dependent upon the assumption of perfectly
competitive producer behavior. In the perfectly competitive case optimal tax
rates tend to follow an inverse elasticities rule: smaller own-price elasticities
are generally associated with larger tax rates. When rms are price setters
this will be weakened, and may even be reversed: the relationship between the
optimal tax rate and the own-price elasticity may be upward sloping.1
This result is based on the following. In the presence of imperfect com-
petition, the governments optimal tax policy has a two-part interpretation:2
First, subsidize each industry to completely o¤set the producer markups. This
brings prices back down to marginal costs. Second, use the familiar Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971) (hereafter DM) tax rule to raise su¢ cient revenue to -
nance the subsidies and also to nance the governments other operations.
The rst part of this decomposition works directly against an inverse elas-
ticities tax rule. A smaller elasticity of demand allows imperfectly competitive
rms to charge a higher markup, which will be o¤set with a larger subsidy.
If lump sum taxation were available, this would be the end of the story. The
government would use an inverse elasticities rule for subsidies and it would pay
for this with the lump sum tax. But in a second best world, the revenue must
come from distortionary taxation  the second part of the decomposition 
and this generates the standard inverse elasticities rule.
Thus the two parts push the optimal tax rate in opposite directions. This
establishes that the inverse elasticities rule will be weakened, but will it be
reversed? The key observation here is that the DM formula includes cross
price e¤ects while the producer markups do not. Specically, the government
internalizes all economic repercussions from each of its taxes because it is con-
cerned with overall economic welfare. By contrast, each rm is only concerned
with the prots it can extract from the industry  or few industries  in
which it operates. This indicates that the rst part of the decomposition (the
subsidy) is likely to be more elasticity sensitive than the second part (the DM
formula). The net result can be a reversal of the inverse elasticities rule. This
will be illustrated with an example in section 4.
The rst part of the tax decomposition may appear to reward high markups
1This result is apparently new. The literature on taxation in imperfectly competitive
economies has generally focused on other issues. Myles (1989) analyzes the impact of op-
timal commodity taxes on compensated demand (the index of discouragement), under the
restriction that prots are not taxed. Auerbach and Hines (2002, section 6) and Myles (1995,
chapter 11) review the literature.
2Guesnerie and La¤ont (1978, p. 450) and Stiglitz (1987, p. 1036) briey mention this
two-part interpretation, but they do not address the implications for inverse elasticities
rules.
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with lower tax rates. However, it is the demand elasticities that drive both.
The paper uses a model of Cournot competition with homogeneous goods
and a xed number of rms.3 In this setting, the elasticity of demand faced
by price setting rms is directly related to the elasticity of demand for the
industry as a whole. The former elasticity determines the size of the markups,
while the latter enters into the DM formula. This facilitates direct comparison
of the two parts of the tax.
One would like to know the extent to which the optimal tax system can
correct the oligopolistic distortions. This question has been addressed pre-
viously by Myles (1996). He nds that when the government has access to
both an ad valorem tax and a specic tax for each industry,4 it is possible to
eliminate all of the adverse e¤ects from oligopoly and thereby attain the DM
second best welfare level. The net outcome  consumer prices and the alloca-
tion  is exactly the same as the perfectly competitive DM case. This result
is also obtained here.5 The reason is that the government is equipped with
two independent tax instruments in each industry. In the present case these
instruments are an industry-specic commodity tax and prots tax. With two
independent instruments for each industry, the government is able to achieve
two targets per industry: the consumer price and the level of distributed prof-
its. In particular, the DM consumer prices may be achieved as well as DMs
zero dividends  the latter via 100 percent taxation of prots. Presumably re-
distributive goals might be met if the prots of di¤erent industries were taxed
at di¤erent rates. However, ne tuning of this instrument seems especially
impractical.6
There is one quirk that may hinder the implementation of the optimal pol-
icy. Recall that a monopolist will never operate where the elasticity of demand
is less than one. An analogous bound holds for Cournot oligopolists. As indi-
cated above, when the government has access to two instruments per industry,
in principle it can achieve the DM consumer prices and allocation. However,
the DM optimum imposes no a priori restriction on the elasticity of demand,
so it may fail to satisfy the Cournot bound. In this case the DM outcome
will not be implementable. It turns out that this problem cannot arise if all
commodity taxes are specic, but for ad valorem taxes it is a possibility. In
previous results, tax theorists have generally found that ad valorem taxation
dominates specic taxation in the presence of imperfect competition.7 The
3The argument extends to other models with producer markups (Reinhorn, 2003).
4Recall that a specic tax is one that is levied on the number of units sold, while an
ad valorem tax is levied on the value of sales.
5See also Guesnerie and La¤ont (1978, theorem 5).
6Appendix D briey considers the other extreme where prots are not taxed at all. It
should be noted that prots may also be present in the perfectly competitive case  e.g.,
Mirrlees (1972), Munk (1978), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971). The distinguishing feature of
imperfect competition is markups, not prots.
7See Suits and Musgrave (1953) for the classic result in this area. For more recent
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di¤erent results are a consequence of the 100 percent prots tax here. This
suggests that when the government must choose between two similar instru-
ments, the optimal choice may be a¤ected by the set of other instruments
already in use.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyzes the optimal tax problem and presents the main theoretical
results. Section 4 uses an example to illustrate the results. Section 5 addresses
the implementation problem that may arise with ad valorem taxes, and shows
that this problem does not arise with specic taxes. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Model
The economy has I industries labeled i = 1; : : : ; I. Industry i contains a
nite number of rms, ni, each of which produces the same homogeneous
good. There is a continuum of identical consumers of mass one.8 Their utility
function is U(`;Q1; : : : ; QI), where ` is consumption of leisure and Qi is con-
sumption of good i. Each consumer is endowed with L units of time and zero
units of good i  1.
Labor is the only factor of production. Each of the ni rms in industry i
has the same cost function Ci(q), where q is the rms output and the costs are
measured in units of labor. Fixed costs in industry i are Ci(0+) := limq#0Ci(q).
Total output in the industry is Qi =
Pni
j=1 qij where qij is the output of rm j
in industry i.
The government uses an exogenous quantity of labor, g, for public produc-
tion. This is taken as exogenous in order to focus exclusively on tax policy.
Thus, public goods do not appear in the consumersutility function since they
never vary. To nance its operations, the government taxes the consumers
labor income at rate t0 and taxes industry i at ad valorem rate ti. (Section 5
considers specic taxes.) Prots in industry i are taxed at rate ti . Lump sum
transfers are ruled out.9
Producer prices are denoted p0, p1, . . . , pI where p0 is the price of labor.
Consumer prices are P0, P1, . . . , PI . These are related by P0 = (1  t0)p0 and
Pi = (1 + ti)pi for i  1.
treatments, see Delipalla and Keen (1992) and Skeath and Trandel (1994), though the
latter paper is subject to the usual criticisms associated with the use of a partial equilibrium
framework for the study of a tax problem. The rst result in favor of ad valorem appears
to be Wicksell (1959) (originally published in 1896) who considered the case of monopoly
under partial equilibrium.
8The extension to heterogeneous consumers is discussed in the conclusion.
9In models with heterogeneous consumers it is reasonable to include a poll tax (or sub-
sidy). But with identical consumers, a poll tax would allow the government to attain the
rst best.
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2.1 Consumers
Each consumer chooses (`;Q1; : : : ; QI)  0 to
maximize U(`;Q1; : : : ; QI)
subject to
IX
i=1
PiQi  P0(L  `) + net
where net is prots net of taxes. Let M := P0L + net. Then the bud-
get constraint can be written P0` +
PI
i=1 PiQi  M . The solution yields
consumption functions `(P;M) and Qi(P;M) for i  1. Indirect utility is
V (P;M) := U(`(P;M);Q(P;M)). Since the mass of consumers is one, these
apply both at the individual level and in the aggregate.
2.2 Firms
Within each industry, rms are prot maximizing Cournot oligopolists.10 Prof-
its for a typical rm in industry i are
pi  [Qi(P;M)  Q^i]  p0Ci(Qi(P;M)  Q^i) (1)
where Q^i < Qi is the output of all other rms in industry i. Each rm treats
the values of Q^i, M , ti, p0, and Pi0 (i0 6= i) as parameters and controls the
producer price pi, choosing it to maximize prots.
Note that these Cournot oligopolists choose price rather than quantity.
But with downward sloping demand curves, the two are equivalent. The key
point is that rms take Q^i as given, regardless of whether price or quantity is
the choice variable.
The rmsprot criterion in (1) is somewhat myopic. Gordon (2003) ob-
serves that shareholders want the value of their portfolios maximized. In
particular, they want the manager of each rm to internalize the e¤ect of his
decisions on the value of their entire portfolio (and more generally, on the
value of their expected utility). If they can exercise inuence over managers
decisions, this may have a signicant impact on rmsobjectives. This topic
is still open for debate. For now, at least, the myopic criterion in (1) seems to
be the predominant view.
The rst order condition for an interior maximum to (1) is
(Qi   Q^i) + Pi@Qi=@Pi   (1 + ti)p0C 0i@Qi=@Pi = 0:
The condition for a symmetric Cournot equilibrium in industry i is
Qi(P;M)=ni + Pi@Qi=@Pi   (1 + ti)p0C 0i(Qi(P;M)=ni)  @Qi=@Pi = 0 (2)
10The extension to conjectural variations is straightforward.
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which incorporates the consistency condition Q^i = (ni 1)Qi=ni. Equation (2)
must hold simultaneously for all industries.
Let ii > 0 be the own-price elasticity of demand. Then (2) has the familiar
form
pi   p0C 0i
pi
=
1
niii
(3)
which states that the Lerner index is negatively related to both the elasticity
and the number of rms. Since the left hand side of (3) is less than one,
ii > 1=ni in equilibrium. This is the elasticity bound for Cournot oligopoly,
which generalizes the monopoly case.
2.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a vector
(t0; t1; : : : ; tI ; t

1 ; : : : ; t

I ; g;
`; Q1; : : : ; QI ; p0; P0; : : : ; PI ; M)
of the labor income tax rate, the sales tax rates, the tax rates on prots,
government expenditure, consumption quantities, the producer price for labor,
consumer prices, and lump sum income that satises the following conditions:
`= `( P; M); Qi = Qi( P; M) i  1 (4)
Qi=ni + Pi@Qi=@Pi   (1 + ti)p0C 0i( Qi=ni)  @Qi=@Pi = 0 i  1 (5)
P0 = (1  t0)p0 (6)
M = P0L+
IX
i=1
(1  ti )[ Pi Qi=(1 + ti)  p0niCi( Qi=ni)] (7)
g + `+
IX
i=1
niCi( Qi=ni)  L (8)
where @Qi=@Pi in (5) is evaluated at ( P; M).
Equation (4) states that the quantities, prices, and income are consistent
with utility maximization. Then (5) is the condition for a symmetric Cournot
equilibrium, while (6) and (7) are just the denitions of P0 and M . Finally,
(8) is the resource constraint. By WalrasLaw, when all these conditions are
met the government automatically satises its budget constraint.
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3 Optimal taxation
The governments goal is to choose a feasible tax policy that maximizes the
welfare of a representative consumer while nancing a given level of govern-
ment spending g. The class of feasible policies will be those which tax away
all economic prots, t = 1. This is optimal when all consumers are identi-
cal since it provides a non-distortionary source of tax revenue (which, under
normal circumstances, does not exceed the governments overall revenue re-
quirement). With heterogeneous consumers, adjustments to t may achieve
distributive goals. However, as indicated in the introduction, this would be
highly impractical. Appendix D briey considers the other extreme, no tax-
ation of prots. The analysis below focuses on the sensitivity of the optimal
tax rate ti to the own-price elasticity ii.
The formal statement of the governments problem is identical to the DM
perfectly competitive case. That is, the governments goal is to nd tax rates
t0; t1; : : : ; tI that support the solution to the following indirect utility maxi-
mization problem: Choose P  0 to
maximize V (P;M)
subject to g + `(P;M) +
IX
i=1
niCi(Qi(P;M)=ni)  L: (9)
Here M = P0L since t = 1. Let   0 be the Lagrange multiplier for (9). It
measures the marginal disutility of an increase in the governments spending
requirement g. If P 0, the rst order conditions are (9) and
@V=@Pj = 
"
@`=@Pj +
IX
i=1
C 0i@Qi=@Pj
#
j  1 (10)
@
@P0
V (P; P0L) = 
@
@P0
"
`(P; P0L) +
IX
i=1
niCi(Qi(P; P0L)=ni)
#
: (11)
By homogeneity, (11) is redundant when (10) holds for all j  1. Once an
optimal P is determined and suitably normalized, the optimal tax rates are
found by solving (5) and (6), with p0 also available for normalization. Two
technical issues are addressed in appendices. Appendix B proves that the
optimization problem has a solution. Appendix C establishes the necessity of
the rst order conditions.
In raw form, the rst order conditions do not o¤er much insight. The
following manipulations will yield a form that links the optimal policy to elas-
ticities.
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Substitute Roys identity, @V=@Pj =  QjVM where VM := @V=@M , into
(10) to get
 QjVM = 
"
@`=@Pj +
IX
i=1
C 0i@Qi=@Pj
#
j  1: (12)
Since the consumersbudget constraint holds as an identity in (P;M), di¤er-
entiation with respect to Pj yields
0 = P0@`=@Pj +Qj +
IX
i=1
Pi@Qi=@Pj j  1: (13)
Multiply (12) by P0, (13) by , subtract, and rearrange to get
   P0VM

=  
IX
i=1
Pi   P0C 0i
Pi
 PiQi
PjQj
 Pj
Qi
@Qi
@Pj
j  1: (14)
Let
~ij :=  PiQi
PjQj
 Pj
Qi
@Qi
@Pj
i  0; j  0
where Q0 := `. The ~ij terms are expenditure weighted elasticities of demand;
~jj is just the own-price elasticity. Note that (13) imposes an adding-up con-
straint:
PI
i=0 ~ij = 1 for all j. Equation (14) can be written as
IX
i=1
Pi   P0C 0i
Pi
~ij =
   P0VM

j  1; or zT ~E = 1T (15)
where the I-vector z has entries zi = xi=y with xi equal to the gross markup
1  P0C 0i=Pi and y = 1  P0VM=, a measure of marginal excess burden. The
I  I matrix ~E has ~ij in row i, column j. The superscript T indicates the
transpose operator. The gross markup xi combines the producer markup and
the tax.
As a benchmark, consider the outcome if optimal lump sum taxation is
available. Since the consumersrst order conditions yield P0VM = @U=@`
while the envelope theorem and (9) yield  =  @V =@g, y is the proportional
di¤erence between the social marginal value of the factor of production and
its private marginal value. At the rst best, y must be zero. Then from (15),
marginal cost pricing is optimal, Pi = P0C 0i. The government achieves this with
subsidies that o¤set the producer markups. This is the inverse elasticities rule
for subsidies that was discussed in the introduction. Return now to the more
interesting case when lump sum taxation is limited to the prots tax.
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3.1 Inverse elasticities rules and reversals
This section addresses the consequences of a marginal change in the own-price
elasticity ~ii. First I analyze the e¤ect on the optimal gross markup xi. Then I
use this to address the e¤ect on the optimal tax rate ti. Generally, one expects
a downward sloping relationship between xi and ~ii. This would be the case
in partial equilibrium, so if general equilibrium interactions are not too per-
vasive the result should also apply here. The analysis treats ~ii as exogenous
and assumes all other entries in ~E are independent of ~ii: @~jk=@~ii = 0 for
all (j; k) 6= (i; i) where ijk 6= 0. This is a strong assumption and, at best,
an approximation. However, even with these general equilibrium e¤ects shut
down, the familiar inverse elasticities rule @xi=@~ii < 0 is not an immediate
consequence. In the general case, without the elasticity independence assump-
tion, the range of possibilities is even greater. One still expects an inverse
elasticities rule, but caution is warranted.
With the above assumptions, di¤erentiation of (15) with respect to ~ii yields
@zT
@~ii
~E =  ziuTi i  1
where ui is the unit vector with 1 in row i. Since ~E will be generically non-
singular,
@zT
@~ii
=  ziuTi ~E 1 i  1:
Post-multiply by ui and rearrange to get
~ii
zi
@zi
@~ii
=  ~ii( ~E 1)ii =  ( ~E)ii( ~E 1)ii i  1 (16)
where ()ij denotes the entry in row i, column j of the corresponding matrix.
Observe that ~E = diag(PjQj)E diag(1=PjQj) where diag indicates the I  I
diagonal matrix with main diagonal entries as indicated and where E is the
I  I matrix with unweighted (signed) elasticity ij in row i, column j. Hence
( ~E 1)ii = (E 1)ii. And since ~ii = ii, (16) becomes
@ log zi
@ log ii
=  (E)ii(E 1)ii; or @ log xi
@ log ii
=
@ log y
@ log ii
  (E)ii(E 1)ii (17)
for i  1, where the second equality uses the denition zi := xi=y.
3.1.1 Lemma. Assume ii is exogenous. Assume all of the other expenditure
weighted elasticities in the matrix ~E are independent of ii. If taxes are op-
timal, (17) must be satised where xi = (Pi   P0C 0i)=Pi is the gross markup
(producer markup and tax) and y = (   P0VM)= is a measure of marginal
8
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excess burden. A negative relationship exists between the industry i markup
and the own-price elasticity if (E)ii(E 1)ii > @ log y=@ log ii. I.e., this is the
condition for a weak inverse elasticities rule. If y is independent of ii, the
condition for a pure inverse elasticities rule is (E)ii(E 1)ii = 1, which will
be satised in the absence of cross-price e¤ects between good i and the other
numbered goods (though cross-price e¤ects with leisure may be present).
3.1.2 Remark. Inverse elasticitieshere refers to a downward sloping re-
lationship between the gross markup and the own-price elasticity, for a given
industry. It does not refer to a cross-industry relationship in which industries
with larger elasticities have smaller markups. From (15), xi = y1T ~E 1ui =
y[P1Q1    PIQI ]E 1ui=PiQi. This formula does not lead to a simple con-
dition under which ii > jj would imply xi < xj. The literature on uniform
taxation (e.g., Besley and Jewitt, 1995, and Deaton, 1979) suggests that cross-
industry comparisons will not lead to general results.
3.1.3 Remark. The condition in the lemma that generates the pure inverse
elasticities rule is highly restrictive. One would be ill-advised to use this rule for
policy. On the other hand, the weak rule is a fairly standard policy prescription
in public economics. It may come as a surprise that the weak rule is not an
automatic result, just a tendency. However, this is due to general equilibrium
e¤ects. The government realizes that in order to raise revenue to pay for g
it must withdraw real physical resources from the economy, as stated in the
resource constraint (9). If demand in an industry becomes less elastic, a higher
tax rate can now be more e¤ective at generating revenue, but physical resources
are now more di¢ cult to withdraw. So a higher tax rate does not provide much
relief for the government to satisfy the resource constraint, and the optimal
response is not immediately clear.
The lemma addressed the sensitivity of the gross markup to changes in the
own-price elasticity. The main concern, however, is the sensitivity of the tax
rate:
3.1.4 Proposition. (a) Normalize P0 = p0 = 1. The optimal ad valorem
tax rate in industry i responds positively to a marginal increase in the own-
price elasticity ii when  @ log xi=@ log ii < (pi   C 0i)=(Pi   C 0i) where xi is
the gross markup. I.e., when this is satised, the inverse elasticities tax rule
is reversed.11 (b) Also assume that ii is exogenous and all other expenditure
weighted elasticities in ~E are independent of ii. Then a reversal occurs when
(E)ii(E
 1)ii   @ log y=@ log ii < (pi   C 0i)=(Pi   C 0i) where y = (   P0VM)=
is a measure of marginal excess burden.
11If marginal cost is constant, the analogous condition for a specic tax is the following:
 @ log xi=@ log ii < (pi=Pi)(pi   C 0i)=(Pi   C 0i).
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Proof. Recall from (3) that the producer markup satises 1   p0C 0i=pi =
1=(niii). Also, the gross markup is given by xi = 1   P0C 0i=Pi. Hence, the
ad valorem tax is
1 + ti =
Pi
pi
=
P0C
0
i=(1  xi)
p0C 0i=[1  1=(niii)]
=
P0
p0
1  1=(niii)
1  xi :
Under the normalization P0 = p0 = 1, this yields
@ log(1 + ti)
@ log ii
=
1
niii   1 +
xi
1  xi
ii
xi
@xi
@ii
=
pi   C 0i
C 0i
+
Pi   C 0i
C 0i
ii
xi
@xi
@ii
where the last equality follows from (3) and the denition of xi. The inverse
elasticities tax rule is reversed when this expression is positive, i.e., when
(pi   C 0i)=(Pi   C 0i) >  @ log xi=@ log ii. This proves part (a). Now use (17)
to prove part (b).
3.1.5 Remark. The key insight from the proposition is: the greater is the
producer markup, the greater is the scope for the inverse elasticities tax rule to
be reversed. More specically, since the producer markup pi C 0i is a measure
of the degree of imperfect competition, the condition in part (a) requires the
perfectly competitive Ramsey e¤ect  @ log xi=@ log ii to be dominated by the
imperfect competition e¤ect (pi C 0i)=(Pi C 0i). This formalizes the discussion
in the introduction regarding the two-part interpretation for the optimal tax
policy. Also note that if industry i is a small part of the whole economy,
@ log y=@ log ii  0. Then the condition in part (b) cannot be satised when
cross-price e¤ects are absent, i.e., it cannot be satised when (E)ii(E 1)ii = 1
(unless good i is subsidized). A pro-elasticities tax rule is likely to require
cross-price e¤ects.
3.1.6 Remark. The analysis above depends on the chosen normalizations.
Consider the ad valorem tax rate t1 = P1=p1 1. Obviously if the normalization
for consumer prices is P1 = 1, while that for producer prices is p1 = 1, then t1
will be quite una¤ected by changes in elasticities. The role of normalizations
is also addressed by Gaube (2005) in the context of environmental taxation.
Here, the normalizations x the consumer and producer prices in the models
only competitive market, labor.
4 Example
The previous section provided conditions under which a pro-elasticities tax
rule could be optimal for an imperfectly competitive economy. In particular,
the condition in proposition 3.1.4(a) requires the producer markup to be su¢ -
ciently large and the Ramsey inverse elasticities e¤ect @ log xi=@ log ii < 0 to
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be su¢ ciently small in magnitude. To explore this further, this section presents
a numerical example in which the inverse elasticities tax rule is reversed for
some parameter values.
The economy has two industries, I = 2. The consumersutility function is
U(`;Q1; Q2) = `+AQ
1
1 Q
2
2 withA = 
 1
1 
 2
2 and i = (i 1)=(1+2 1).12
The is are the own-price elasticities. They are restricted to satisfy i > 1.
This ensures concavity of U . The relationship i = 1 + i=(1   1   2) is
useful. The solution to the consumersproblem is
Qi = i(Pi=P0)
 i(Pj=P0)1 j for j = 3  i
` = L  (1 + 2)(P1=P0)1 1(P2=P0)1 2
and indirect utility is V = L + (1  1   2)(P1=P0)1 1(P2=P0)1 2 . Assume
L is su¢ ciently large that `  0.
The rmscost functions are a¢ ne, Ci(q) = Fi + ciq. Markups are deter-
mined by (3):
pi   p0ci
pi
=
1
nii
; or
pi
p0
=
niici
nii   1 :
For these functional forms, the matrix of expenditure weighted elasticities
is
~E =

1 1   1
2   1 2

and hence the optimality condition (15) yields
z1 = z2 = 1=(1 + 2   1):
Recall that zi is the ratio of the gross markup xi to the marginal excess burden
y. Thus zi follows a clean inverse elasticities rule, but the behavior of the
markup must be disentangled from the excess burden before reaching any
further conclusions.
Also, note the role of general equilibrium e¤ects. These were curtailed in
the derivation of (16) and (17) by the independence assumption, @~jk=@~ii = 0
for all (j; k) 6= (i; i). But here, @~12=@~11 = 1 = @~21=@~22. This just reinforces
the importance of economy-wide linkages in the optimal tax problem.
In addition to (15), the other condition for the governments optimum is
12Although this U does not satisfy assumption 1 in appendix A.1, it is adequately well
behaved. The demand curve for good i is smooth, downward sloping, and asymptotic to the
price axis.
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the resource constraint (9), with equality:
g + n1F1 + n2F2
= L  `  c1Q1   c2Q2
= (1 + 2)(P1=P0)
1 1(P2=P0)1 2   c11(P1=P0) 1(P2=P0)1 2
  c22(P1=P0)1 1(P2=P0) 2 :
Since z1 = z2 and since zi = xi=y, it follows that P0c1=P1 = P0c2=P2. Replace
P2 with c2P1=c1 in the resource constraint and collect terms to get
P1
P0c1
= 1 +

g + n1F1 + n2F2
1 + 2
c1 11 c
2 1
2

P1
P0c1
1+2 1
: (18)
This equation has a number of properties. It has a solution for P1=P0c1 if
and only if g + n1F1 + n2F2  c1 11 c1 22 (1 + 2   2)1+2 1=(1 + 2   1)1+2.
Not surprisingly, government purchases plus xed costs cannot be too large.
If this condition holds with equality, the solution is unique. Otherwise the
equation has two positive solutions. The smaller of the two is optimal for the
governments problem since V is decreasing in P1=P0 and P2=P0. Iterations
on (18), starting from P1=P0c1 = 0, converge monotonically to the smaller
solution. That solution always satises 1  P1=P0c1  1 + 1=(1 + 2   2).
Observe from (18) that every parameter other than L a¤ects P1=P0c1. The
Ramsey prices do not satisfy a simple, clean inverse elasticities rule.
Table 1 and gure 1 show prices and tax rates as the elasticity 1 is varied.
Both p0 and P0 are normalized to unity. The results show that the consumer
price P1 (and hence the gross markup 1 c1=P1) is decreasing in 1. This would
be the standard inverse elasticities rule in the perfectly competitive case. But
here, the specic tax P1   p1 and the ad valorem tax t1 = (P1   p1)=p1 are
a¤ected by the producer markup. Both of these tax rates respond inversely for
small values of 1, but the inverse elasticities rule is reversed for larger values.
The table also presents the ad valorem tax rate for industry 2. Note that
the industry with the higher elasticity always has the higher ad valorem rate.
As 1 rises, industry 1s rate rises relative to industry 2s, and eventually in-
dustry 2 receives a subsidy.13 This reverses another conventional wisdom that
industries with higher elasticities should face lower tax rates. As mentioned
in remark 3.1.2, this conventional wisdom is not so wise even in the perfectly
competitive case.
Figure 2 shows the e¤ect of various parameters. From proposition 3.1.4(a),
any change that strengthens the Ramsey e¤ect favors an inverse elasticities
tax rule, while any change that boosts the producer markup favors a pro-
elasticities rule. The top left panel shows the e¤ect of changes in government
13The subsidy reects, in part, the modest level of g + n1F1 + n2F2.
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1 1.05 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50
P1 1.183 1.149 1.127 1.115 1.108 1.103 1.100
p1 1.157 1.129 1.105 1.089 1.077 1.068 1.061
P1   p1 0.025 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.035 0.039
t1 = (P1   p1)=p1 0.022 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.028 0.033 0.037
t2 = (P2   p2)=p2 0.070 0.039 0.020 0.009 0.002 -0.002 -0.005
Table 1: Numerical results for the examples optimal tax equilibrium. Di¤erent
columns correspond to di¤erent values for the elasticity parameter 1. Other
parameter values and the normalizations are held constant: 2 = 1:5, c1 =
c2 = 1, n1 = n2 = 7, g + n1F1 + n2F2 = 0:05, p0 = P0 = 1.
-
1
6
P1=c1
p1=c1
1 + t1
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
1.00
1.05
1.10
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a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
Figure 1: The top curve (dots) shows the Ramsey markup P1=c1 as a function
of the own-price elasticity 1. The middle curve (circles) shows the producer
markup p1=c1. The bottom curve (boxes) shows 1 + t1 where t1 is the ad
valorem tax rate. Parameter values and normalizations are the same as table 1.
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spending, g. The middle curve in this panel reproduces the baseline and is
labeled with g = 0:02 (hence n1F1 + n2F2 = 0:03). Larger values of g raise
the need for revenue so the whole tax curve shifts up. Also, larger values
of g increase the dependence on distortionary taxation so the Ramsey e¤ect
becomes more dominant and the tax rule moves in the direction of inverse
elasticities.
The top right panel shows the e¤ect of changes in market power in indus-
try 1. This is achieved by changing the number of rms, n1, with no change in
aggregate xed costs. I.e., n1F1 is kept constant so larger values of n1 reduce
the producer markup without adding to deadweight xed costs. As n1 !1,
the markup vanishes and the industry is, in e¤ect, perfectly competitive. Since
smaller n1 boosts the markup, this favors a pro-elasticities tax rule as illus-
trated. The gure also shows that the whole curve shifts down for smaller n1.
Recall that the tax is a combination of a corrective subsidy to neutralize the
markup and a revenue raising component. With fewer rms, the markup is
larger so the corrective subsidy is larger and this pulls down the tax.
The bottom left panel shows the e¤ect of changes in marginal cost in in-
dustry 1. Changes in c1 (from curve to curve) and changes in 1 (along each
curve) interact in a particular way for this example. An increase in 1 not
only raises the elasticity of demand for good 1, it also shifts out the demand
curve since Q1 = 1(P1=P0) 1(P2=P0)1 2 and 1 increases with 1. So if c1
is larger, an increase in 1, other things equal, causes a larger increase in la-
bor costs in industry 1. The government recognizes this cost and o¤sets it in
part with policy to reduce demand: an increase in t1. I.e., a large c1 favors a
pro-elasticities rule.
The bottom right panel shows the e¤ect of changes in 2, the elasticity of
demand in industry 2. Since the government internalizes cross price e¤ects,
the optimal choice for P1 is inuenced not only by 1 but also by 2. In this
particular example, when marginal costs equal one, P1 is a function of 1+ 2.
Hence, as 2 increases, 1 becomes proportionately less of an inuence on P1,
which works against the inverse elasticities rule. As the gure illustrates, larger
values of 2 favor a pro-elasticities rule.
These exercises identify the way in which the optimal tax rule responds to
some key parameters. For any other choice of functional forms, the results may
di¤er to some extent, yet the same type of reasoning will still apply. One must
compare those features that enhance the Ramsey e¤ect (inverse elasticities)
with those that enhance the producer markup (pro-elasticities).
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Figure 2: The optimal ad valorem tax rate t1 as a function of the own-price
elasticity 1. In each panel, the middle curve reproduces the baseline. The
other curves illustrate departures from the baseline, as indicated. Baseline
parameters and normalizations are given in table 1.
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5 Comparison of ad valorem and specic tax-
ation
The theoretical analysis in section 3 overlooked a subtlety. At the end of
section 2.2, one of the conditions for a symmetric Cournot equilibrium is
ii > 1=ni for all i. (19)
This constraint was not imposed on the optimal tax problem. Consequently,
the solution to that problem  the DM allocation  will not be implementable
unless it satises (19).14 If this elasticity bound does not hold, the optimal
tax problem is unlikely to have any solution with ad valorem taxes. Since the
DM problem has no elasticity constraints built into it, this scenario cannot be
ruled out a priori.
If specic taxes and subsidies are used rather than ad valorem, no bound is
imposed on ii, so the DM allocation can always be implemented. To demon-
strate this, it is convenient to simplify the notation by dropping the industry
subscript i and suppressing all but the essential variables. The rms problem
is to choose p  0 to maximize
p 
h
Q
 
P (p)
  Q^i  p0CQ P (p)  Q^
where P (p) is given by P = (1 + t)p in the ad valorem case, and P = p+ t in
the specic case. The rst order condition is
Q  Q^+ (p  p0C 0)dQ
dP
dP
dp
= 0:
Since Q  Q^ = Q=n in equilibrium, this yields
1
n
= (1  p0C 0=p)d logP
d log p
:
In the ad valorem case, d logP=d log p  1, hence the bound in (19). In the
specic case, d logP=d log p = p=P . Therefore,
1
n
=
p  p0C 0
P
=
P   t  p0C 0
P
:
This always has a solution for t, even if (19) does not hold. Though in that
case, t   p0C 0 which could be a rather hefty subsidy.15 Thus, in some
14 If this condition fails, the formulas for 1+ ti and pi yield nonsense results. Specically,
if ii = 1=ni then 1 + ti = 0 and pi = Pi=(1 + ti) is undened, while if ii < 1=ni then
1 + ti < 0 and pi < 0.
15When (19) does not hold, p remains positive unlike the ad valorem case (footnote 14).
This follows since p = P=(n) + p0C 0 which is positive if P is positive.
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cases specic taxes and subsidies are preferred to ad valorem. This stands in
contrast to Delipalla and Keen (1992), which extends a result due to Suits and
Musgrave (1953), where ad valorem taxation is always preferred. The source
of the di¤erence in results is that their model does not include a tax on prots.
This demonstrates that the optimal choice between two tax instruments may
be a¤ected by the set of other instruments that are already in use.
6 Conclusion
When rms are not perfectly competitive the familiar inverse elasticities rule
for optimal tax rates is weakened and perhaps even reversed. The reason is
that the tax rates are used in part as instruments to o¤set the adverse welfare
e¤ects from producer markups. Producer markups are higher in industries
where demand is less elastic, so tax rates in these industries should be lowered
to counteract the markups and thereby improve social welfare.
Two other results were obtained. First, if the government has a rich enough
set of policy instruments then the adverse welfare e¤ects from imperfect com-
petition can be completely nullied. See also Myles (1996). Second, specic
taxation may be preferred to ad valorem in some cases. This latter result
di¤ers from Delipalla and Keen (1992), and it demonstrates that the opti-
mal choice between two instruments can depend on the entire array of policy
instruments in use.
The paper used a model with identical consumers. If consumers are het-
erogeneous, the optimal tax policy continues to have a two-part interpretation
as emphasized in the text. First, subsidize all of the imperfectly competitive
industries to exactly o¤set the producer markups. Then raise revenue to cover
the cost of the subsidies plus all other government operations by following the
Diamond (1975) rule for a perfectly competitive economy with heterogeneous
consumers. Since the rst part of this decomposition subsidizes (lowers the tax
rate) most where demand is least elastic, the e¤ect of imperfect competition
is to push optimal tax rates away from any inverse elasticities rule. The logic
of this argument extends beyond the Cournot case to more general models,
including those with imperfect competition in markets for intermediate goods
(Judd, 2002, 2003).
The empirical evidence demonstrates that non-trivial markups are present
throughout the US economy (e.g., Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988,
Hall, 1988). This suggests that perfectly competitive Ramsey tax rules may
be suboptimal. The challenge then is to devise an alternative policy that
addresses the welfare costs of producer markups, and that still allows rms
to recover their xed costs. One of the messages from this paper is that a
carefully designed tax system can accomplish this.
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Appendix A Details of the agentsproblems
Appendix A.1 Consumers
Consumers always choose an interior consumption point. Then no industry
ever closes down. This is a convenient assumption since, with xed costs
of production, an industry closure would create a discontinuity. Formally,
assumption 1(b) states that any indi¤erence surface of U that has a non-empty
intersection with the interior of the non-negative orthant is in fact contained
entirely within the interior of the non-negative orthant. This, together with
assumption 1(a) implies that `(P;M), Q(P;M), and V (P;M) are all smooth
functions on the strictly positive orthant (Mas-Colell, 1985, section 2.7). Since
all consumers are identical, assumption 1(c) ensures that each industry faces
a downward sloping demand curve.
Assumption 1.
(a) U is dened on the non-negative orthant where it is a continuous function
that does not attain a maximum. On the interior of the non-negative
orthant, U is strictly quasi-concave and smooth (has derivatives of all
orders). The gradient of U never vanishes. The determinant of the
bordered Hessian matrix of U never vanishes.
(b) If (`;Q1; : : : ; QI)  0 and 0 2 f^`; Q^1; : : : ; Q^Ig then U(`;Q1; : : : ; QI) >
U(^`; Q^1; : : : ; Q^I).
(c) All goods `;Q1; : : : ; QI are normal (positive income elasticity of demand)
under U .
Appendix A.2 Firms
Assume the rmscost functions are smooth and convex (for strictly positive
output), and that marginal costs are strictly positive:
Assumption 2. For each i, Ci : IR+ ! IR+ with Ci(0) = 0. On IR++ each Ci
is smooth, strictly increasing, and convex.
From section 2.2, the prot function for a typical rm in industry i is
i(pi; p0; ti; Q^i;M;P i) := pi  [Qi(P;M)  Q^i]  p0Ci(Qi(P;M)  Q^i):
The arguments of i must satisfy 0 < pi  (1 + ti) 1Pi(Q^i;M;P i) and
(p0; 1 + ti; Q^i;M;P i)  0. The upper bound on pi is equivalent to qi  0.
The lower bound on pi is a strict inequality because demand might not even
be dened when price equals zero. In any event, it is innocuous to restrict the
rm from choosing pi = 0 since that price generates no revenue.
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Assumption 3. Consider i as a function of pi on the following open interval:
0 < pi < (1 + ti)
 1Pi(Q^i;M;P i). Assume that i is transformable into a
strictly concave function by means of a di¤erentiable bijection of the domain
(pi) and a di¤erentiable, strictly increasing transformation of the range. (If i
is already strictly concave then it satises this condition.)
Assumption 3 guarantees that any solution to @i=@pi = 0 which yields
i > 0 (and hence is preferred to the corner solution qi = 0) uniquely solves
the prot maximization problem (Ben-Tal, 1977).16 It is su¢ cient for i to
be concave transformable only at the equilibrium values for p0; ti; Q^i;M;P i.
Implicitly, this assumption imposes restrictions on the demand curves and
hence the utility function. In general, these are restrictions on the third order
derivatives of U since concave transformability of i has a characterization
involving the second order derivatives of the demand functions (Ben-Tal, 1977).
Whether or not assumption 3 holds in practice is an empirical question.
Recall from section 2.2 that the condition for a symmetric Cournot equi-
librium is, for all i  1,
Qi(P;M)=ni + Pi@Qi=@Pi   (1 + ti)p0C 0i(Qi(P;M)=ni)  @Qi=@Pi = 0: (2)
Assumption 4. Let (t1; : : : ; tI)  1, M > 0, P0 > 0, and p0 > 0 be given.
If (2) has a solution (P1; : : : ; PI) 0, then the solution is unique.
Solving (2) for consumer prices Pi is equivalent to solving for producer
prices pi since Pi = (1 + ti)pi. The existence of a unique solution to (2) is
required only at the governments optimal choice of tax rates. Existence will
be assured at that optimum since the government will choose the tax rates ti
to be consistent with (2) for a targeted set of consumer prices P and lump
sum incomeM .17 Assumption 4 requires the solution to be unique. This avoids
the need to worry about coordination problems which would otherwise arise if
there were multiple symmetric Cournot equilibria.
Appendix B Existence of an optimum
This appendix proves that there is a solution to the indirect utility maximiza-
tion problem considered in section 3. Appendix C then establishes that the
solution(s) must satisfy the rst order conditions. Throughout, reference will
be made to assumption 5 which is stated in appendix C.
To prove the existence of a solution, normalize prices using the unit simplex,
 := f(P0; : : : ; PI)  0 :
PI
j=0 Pj = 1g.
16When the xed costs Ci(0+) are not too large the solution will be interior.
17If the government behaved di¤erently, or if tax rates were set exogenously, then existence
could be a problem.
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Inequality (9) (with M = P0L) denes the constraint set to consist of only
those price vectors P  0 that generate technologically feasible allocations.
It is convenient to replace the consumption set IRI+1+ with f(`;Q)  0 : ` +PI
i=1 niCi(Qi=ni)  Lg. This is a compact convex set which is not empty
under assumption 5(a). Since g > 0, every feasible allocation satises ` +PI
i=1 niCi(Qi=ni) < L. Thus, truncating the consumption set in this way
does not alter the constraint set as dened by (9), nor does it a¤ect the level
of indirect utility on the constraint set. However, it does ensure that the
demand functions are well-dened throughout .
The constraint set consists of those points where the o¤er curve intersects
the set of feasible allocations. (The o¤er curve is just the range of the vector
of consumer demands as prices cover .) This set could be empty if g is too
large. Assumption 5(a) below rules out this possibility.
The existence of a maximum would be established if the demand functions
were continuous. For then the objective function V () would be continuous,
and the constraint set would be non-empty and compact. Unfortunately, there
may be prices where demand is not continuous. From Debreu (1959), demand
will be continuous at P if the endowment is not a point of minimum wealth at
those prices. DM satisfy this requirement for continuity by taking an interior
endowment point. But here, only leisure is endowed in a positive quantity. So
the endowment could be a point of minimum wealth if P0 = 0. Otherwise,
demand will be continuous.
It is impossible for any price vector with P0 = 0 to maximize indirect utility
subject to (9). To see this, note that there must be at least one i  1 with
Pi > 0 and for any such i, Qi(P; P0L) = 0 to satisfy the budget constraint,
since P0 = 0 implies that wealth is zero. The interiority assumption 1(b), and
assumption 5(a) below rule out such a point as a maximizer.
Even though demand is not continuous throughout , a maximum still
exists. Let V  be the supremum of indirect utility on the constraint set. Then
there are prices Pn in the constraint set such that V (Pn; P n0 L) " V . Let `n :=
`(Pn; P n0 L) and Q
n := Q(Pn; P n0 L). Then f(Pn; `n;Qn)g1n=1 has a limit point
(P; `;Q) with P 2  and (`;Q) in the compact consumption set. To
save on notation, assume that the original sequence converges. Now if demand
is continuous at P then P lies in the constraint set and V (P; P 0L) = V
,
so P is a maximizer. Otherwise, P 0 = 0. I will prove that P

0 6= 0. First
observe that the demand functions satisfy the budget constraint:
P n0 `
n +
IX
i=1
P ni Q
n
i  P n0 L n  1:
Let n tend to innity to get
P 0 `
 +
IX
i=1
P i Q

i  P 0L:
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Thus (`;Q) could have been purchased at prices P. Therefore,
V (P; P 0L)  U(`;Q)
= lim
n!1
U(`n;Qn)
= lim
n!1
V (Pn; P n0 L)
= V :
On the other hand, if P 0 = 0 then as discussed above there would be at least
one i with Qi(P; P 0L) = 0 so V (P
; P 0L) would be strictly less than V
. This
rules out the possibility that P 0 = 0 and thereby establishes that a maximum
exists.
Appendix C Necessity of the rst order con-
ditions
In order to show that the rst order conditions (10) must hold at any maximum
it must rst be the case that demand is su¢ ciently smooth there to evaluate the
necessary derivatives. This will be true if P  0. Furthermore, with P  0,
(9) holds with equality (DM) and it is appropriate to take (10) as an equality, as
written, rather than as a weak inequality. If preferences are strictly monotone
then no price can be zero at the maximum. This is assumption 5(b). Without
a constraint qualication the maximizer(s) might not satisfy (10). Following
DM, assumption 5(c) rules out any tangency between the o¤er curve and the
set of feasible allocations. Then P must satisfy (10).
Assumption 5.
(a) There exists P 2  that satises `(P; P0L) > 0, Qi(P; P0L) > 0 for
i  1, and
g + `(P; P0L) +
IX
i=1
niCi(Qi(P; P0L)=ni)  L:
(b) Preferences are strictly monotone: (`;Q)  (^`; Q^) implies U(`;Q) 
U(^`; Q^) with equality only if (`;Q) = (^`; Q^).
(c) Suppose g+`(P; P0L)+
PI
i=1 niCi(Qi(P; P0L)=ni) = L for some P 0.
Then
@
@Pj
"
`(P; P0L) +
IX
i=1
niCi(Qi(P; P0L)=ni)
#
6= 0 j  1:
21
Reinhorn: Optimal taxation with Cournot oligopoly
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
Assumption 5(c) deserves a brief comment. Since @V=@Pj < 0 wherever
P 0, the derivative in 5(c) must be non-positive at P. Otherwise a feasible
increase in utility would be available. Therefore, 5(c) requires that derivative
to be strictly negative at P.
Assumption 5 does not rule out the possible existence of additional solu-
tions to (9) and (10) other than the global maximizers. These conditions are
necessary, but in general they are not su¢ cient. This is a common problem
in the optimal taxation literature  e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, ch. 12),
DM, Mirrlees (1986).
Appendix D Zero prots tax
Recall that the equilibrium conditions are (4) through (8). Solve (5) for 1+ ti,
substitute this into (7), and use (4) to get
M = P0L+
IX
i=1
p0(1  ti )
PiQi(P;M)C
0
i(Qi(P;M)=ni)@Qi=@Pi
Qi(P;M)=ni + Pi@Qi=@Pi
  niCi(Qi(P;M)=ni)

where @Qi=@Pi is evaluated at (P;M). Assume that this equation has a unique
solution M = (P; p0(1   t)), dened on some domain.18 If t = 1 then
(P;0) = P0L as in section 3. Note that  is homogeneous of degree one:
(P; p0(1  t)) = (P; p0(1  t)).
Now substitute into the resource constraint (8) to get one condition that
characterizes equilibrium:
g + `(P; ) +
IX
i=1
niCi(Qi(P; )=ni)  L
where the arguments of  have been suppressed. The governments problem
is to maximize V (P; ) subject to the above constraint. If the prots tax is
shut down as in Myles (1989), then t = 0 and p0 = P0.19 The Lagrangian is
L = V (P; )  
"
`(P; ) +
IX
i=1
niCi(Qi(P; )=ni)
#
18If there were many households, each would have an equation describing its sources of
income, and these equations would then be solved simultaneously. In this case, Qi(P;M)
would be a function of the vector of householdsincomes.
19A 100 percent prots tax could be mimicked with p0=P0 = 0. Hence a restriction is
necessary and the natural choice is to exempt labor from taxation: p0 = P0. See Myles (1989,
pp. 9697) for further discussion.
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with  evaluated at (P; P01). Assuming di¤erentiability, the rst order condi-
tion for Pj is
@V
@Pj
+
@V
@M
@
@Pj
= 
IX
i=0
C 0i

@Qi
@Pj
+
@Qi
@M
@
@Pj

j  1 (20)
where Q0 := ` and C 00 := 1. (Labor is transformable one-for-one into leisure.)
By homogeneity, the rst order condition for P0 is redundant. Note that
the rst best is achieved when  equals the consumersexpenditure function
evaluated at the rst best utility. Then @=@Pj = Qj so the left hand side
of (20) is zero while the expression in brackets on the right hand side is the
Slutsky substitution term, and the equation is satised with C 0i proportional
to Pi: marginal cost pricing.
Further analysis of the rst order conditions could proceed as in section 3.1.
But for the sake of concreteness, consider again the example from section 4,
and modify it by shutting down the prots tax. Recall that the solution to
the consumersand rmsproblems are
Q1 = 1(P1=P0)
 1(P2=P0)1 2
Q2 = 2(P1=P0)
1 1(P2=P0) 2
` = M=P0   (1 + 2)(P1=P0)1 1(P2=P0)1 2
V = M=P0 + (1  1   2)(P1=P0)1 1(P2=P0)1 2
pi=p0 = niici=(nii   1)
i = (pi   p0ci)Qi   p0niFi = p0ciQi=(nii   1)  p0niFi
where i is total prots in industry i. In equilibrium, the consumersincome
is M = P0L+ (1  t1 )1 + (1  t2 )2. When ti = 0 for all i and p0 = P0,
M=P0 = L  n1F1   n2F2 + c1Q1=(n11   1) + c2Q2=(n22   1): (21)
It is quite helpful here that demand for goods 1 and 2 is independent of income
since (21) is then an explicit solution for M=P0, after substitution.
With this solution for income, the governments objective is
V = (1  1   2)(P1=P0)1 1(P2=P0)1 2 + c11
n11   1(P1=P0)
 1(P2=P0)1 2
+
c22
n22   1(P1=P0)
1 1(P2=P0) 2 + constant
23
Reinhorn: Optimal taxation with Cournot oligopoly
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
1 1.05 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50
P1 1.195 1.179 1.159 1.142 1.129 1.119 1.110
p1 1.157 1.129 1.105 1.089 1.077 1.068 1.061
P1   p1 0.037 0.050 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.051 0.049
(P1   p1)=p1 0.032 0.044 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.047
(P2   p2)=p2 0.069 0.061 0.049 0.038 0.029 0.021 0.016
Table 2: Numerical results for the examples optimal tax equilibrium with
no prots tax. Di¤erent columns correspond to di¤erent values for the elas-
ticity parameter 1. Other parameter values and the normalizations are held
constant: 2 = 1:5, c1 = c2 = 1, n1 = n2 = 7, g = 0:02, p0 = P0 = 1.
and its budget constraint (which is equivalent to the resource constraint) is
g  t1p1Q1=P0 + t2p2Q2=P0
= P1Q1=P0 + P2Q2=P0   p1Q1=p0   p2Q2=p0
= (1 + 2)(P1=P0)
1 1(P2=P0)1 2   n11c11
n11   1 (P1=P0)
 1(P2=P0)1 2
  n22c22
n22   1 (P1=P0)
1 1(P2=P0) 2
where the second line uses P0 = p0. With the normalization P0 = 1, the rst
order conditions for the constrained optimization problem can be manipulated
to yield
(n22   1)[1 + 2 + n1(1  2)]P2=c2
= (n11   1)[1 + 2 + n2(1  1)]P1=c1   n11 + n22:
This equation can be solved for P2 and substituted into the governments
budget constraint (with equality) to get a single equation in P1. Then the
optimal P1 is the smallest solution that satises both P1 > 0 and P2 > 0.
Table 2 presents numerical results. Observe that the inverse elasticities
rule is reversed for small values of 1. For larger values, the tax on good 1
is relatively constant. As in table 1, the industry with the higher elasticity
always has the higher ad valorem tax rate.
24
Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol5/iss1/art6
References
[1] Atkinson, Anthony B. and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980). Lectures on Public
Economics, New York: McGraw-Hill.
[2] Auerbach, Alan J. and James R. Hines Jr. (2002). Taxation and economic
e¢ ciency,chapter 21 in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, editors,
Handbook of Public Economics, volume 3, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[3] Ben-Tal, Aharon (1977). On generalized means and generalized convex
functions,Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 21, 113.
[4] Besley, Timothy J. and Ian D. Jewitt (1995). Uniform taxation and
consumer preferences,Journal of Public Economics 58, 7384.
[5] Deaton, Angus S. (1979). The distance function in consumer behaviour
with applications to index numbers and optimal taxation, Review of
Economic Studies 46, 391405.
[6] Debreu, Gerard (1959). Theory of Value, New York: Wiley.
[7] Delipalla, Soa and Michael Keen (1992). The comparison between
ad valorem and specic taxation under imperfect competition,Journal
of Public Economics 49, 351367.
[8] Diamond, Peter A. (1975). A many-person Ramsey tax rule, Journal
of Public Economics 4, 335342.
[9] Diamond, Peter A. and James A. Mirrlees (1971). Optimal taxation and
public production I: Production e¢ ciency,and II: Tax rules,American
Economic Review 61, 827 and 261278.
[10] Domowitz, Ian, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen (1988). Mar-
ket structure and cyclical uctuations in U.S. manufacturing,Review of
Economics and Statistics 70, 5566.
[11] Gaube, Thomas (2005). Second-best pollution taxation and environmen-
tal quality,Frontiers of Economic Analysis & Policy 1, issue 1, article 1.
[12] Gordon, Roger H. (2003). Do publicly traded corporations act in the
public interest? Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy 3, issue 1,
article 2.
[13] Guesnerie, Roger and Jean-Jacques La¤ont (1978). Taxing price mak-
ers,Journal of Economic Theory 19, 423455.
[14] Hall, Robert E. (1988). The relationship between price and marginal cost
in U.S. industry,Journal of Political Economy 96, 921947.
25
Reinhorn: Optimal taxation with Cournot oligopoly
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
[15] Judd, Kenneth L. (2002). Capital-income taxation with imperfect com-
petition,American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 92, 417
421.
[16] Judd, Kenneth L. (2003). The optimal tax rate for capital income is
negative,manuscript, Hoover Institution.
[17] Mas-Colell, Andreu (1985).The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium:
A Di¤erentiable Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[18] Mirrlees, James A. (1972). On producer taxation,Review of Economic
Studies 39, 105111.
[19] Mirrlees, James A. (1986). The theory of optimal taxation,chapter 24
in Kenneth J. Arrow and Michael D. Intriligator, editors, Handbook of
Mathematical Economics, volume 3, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[20] Munk, Knud J. (1978). Optimal taxation and pure prot,Scandinavian
Journal of Economics 80, 119.
[21] Myles, Gareth D. (1989). Ramsey tax rules for economies with imperfect
competition,Journal of Public Economics 38, 95115.
[22] Myles, Gareth D. (1995). Public Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[23] Myles, Gareth D. (1996). Imperfect competition and the optimal combi-
nation of ad valorem and specic taxation,International Tax and Public
Finance 3, 2944.
[24] Ramsey, Frank P. (1927). A contribution to the theory of taxation,
Economic Journal 37, 4761.
[25] Reinhorn, Leslie J. (2003). Optimal taxation with monopolistic compe-
tition,manuscript.
[26] Skeath, Susan E. and Gregory A. Trandel (1994). A Pareto comparison
of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments,Journal
of Public Economics 53, 5371.
[27] Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1987). Pareto e¢ cient and optimal taxation and the
new new welfare economics,chapter 15 in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin
Feldstein, editors, Handbook of Public Economics, volume 2, Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
[28] Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Partha Dasgupta (1971). Di¤erential taxation,
public goods, and economic e¢ ciency,Review of Economic Studies 38,
151174.
26
Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol5/iss1/art6
[29] Suits, Daniel B. and Richard A. Musgrave (1953). Ad valorem and unit
taxes compared,Quarterly Journal of Economics 67, 598604.
[30] Wicksell, Knut (1959). Taxation in the monopoly case, chapter 16 in
Richard A. Musgrave and Carl S. Shoup, editors, Readings in the Eco-
nomics of Taxation, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.
27
Reinhorn: Optimal taxation with Cournot oligopoly
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
